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CIVIL PROCEDURE-QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION-ASSERTION OF
QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION UNDER RULE OF SEIDER V. ROTH HELD VIO-
LATIVE OF DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
Rush v. Savchuk (U.S. 1980)
On January 13, 1972, Jeffrey Savchuk and Randal Rush were involved in
a single-car accident in Indiana.' Plaintiff Savchuk, a passenger in the vei-
cle, initiated an action in Minnesota state court against Rush 2 alleging negi-
gence and seeking damages for injuries resulting from the accident.3  Pur-
suant to a Minnesota statute, 4 a garnishment summons was served on Rush's
insurer, the State Farm Insurance Company. 5  Savchuk thus sought to se-
1. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), aff'd on rehearing, 311 Minn.
496, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). At the time of the accident, both
parties were Indiana residents, but the plaintiff subsequently moved to Minnesota with his
parents. 311 Minn. at 482, 245 N.W.2d at 626. All of the witnesses and records involved are
situated in Indiana. Id.
2. 311 Minn. at 482, 245 N.W.2d at 626. Indiana's guest statute and the running of the
state's two-year statute of limitations barred Savchuk from bringing suit in Indiana, 311 Minn.
496, 502 n.5, 272 N.W.2d 888, 891 n.5 (1978). Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found no suggestion of forum shopping anywhere in the record. Id. at 505 n.7, 272 N.V.2d at
893 n.7.
3. 311 Minn. at 482, 245 N.W.2d at 626.
4. MINN. STAT. § 571.41, subd. 2 (Supp. 1979). The Minnesota prejudgment garnishment
procedure provides in pertinent part:
Subd. 2. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, a plaintiff in any
action in a court of record for the recovery of money may issue a garnishee summons
before judgment therein in the following instances only:
(b) If the court shall order the issuance of such summons, if a summons and com-
plaint is filed with the appropriate court and either served on the defendant or delivered
to a sheriff for service on the defendant not more than 30 days after the order is signed,
and if* upon application to the court it shall appear that:
(2) The purpose of the garnishment is to establish quasi in rein jurisdiction and that
(b) defendant is a nonresident individual, or a foreign corporation, partnership associ-
ation.
(3) The garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of suretyship, guarantee, or
insurance, because of which the garnishee may be held to respond to any person for the
claim asserted against the debtor in the main action.
Id. The Supreme Court found that the version of the statute in existence at the time of the
original Minnesota opinion did not differ from the current version in any significant respect. 444
U.S. at 322 n.2.
5. 311 Minn. at 482, 245 N.W.2d at 626. State Farm is an Illinois corporation doing busi-
ness in each of the fifty states. 444 U.S. 320, 323 n.4 (1980), citing THE INSURANCE ALMANAC
431-32 (1977).
In response to the garnishment summons, State Farm averred that nothing was "due and
owing" to Rush under the terms of the policy agreement. 311 Minn. at 482, 245 N.W.2d at 626.
See MINN. STAT. § 571.495 (Supp. 1979). Savchuk then moved the trial court for permission to
file a supplement complaint making State Farm a party to the action. 311 Minn. at 482, 245
N.W.2d at 626. See MINN. STAT. § 571.51 (Supp. 1979). In response, both Rush and State
Farm moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of juris-
diction over the defendant, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process. 311
Minn. at 482, 245 N.W.2d at 626. The trial court granted Savchuk's motion, and the defendants
then appealed. Id. at 483, 245 N.W.2d at 626-27.
(811)
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cure quasi in rem jurisdiction 6 under which the insurer's obligation to defend
and indemnify Rush constituted the necessary res.
7
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in affirming the state district court's
denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, upheld
the constitutionality of the prejudgment garnishment procedure. 8  The
United States Supreme Court vacated the Minnesota judgment 9 and remanded
the case for further consideration in light of its recent decision in Shafer v.
Heitner.'0  On rehearing, the Minnesota Supreme Court again sustained the
validity of the statutory process,"5 concluding that the legislation fully com-
ported with Shaffer's due process standards for asserting quasi in rein juris-
diction. 12  On direct appeal, 13 the United States Supreme Court reversed,
14
6. 311 Minn. at 482-83, 245 N.W.2d at 626-27. Rush had insufficient contacts with the
state of Minnesota for that state to exercise in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 490, 245 N.W.2d at
630 (Otis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the traditional types of jurisdiction, see note 15
infra.
7. 311 Minn. at 490, 245 N.W.2d at 631 (Otis, J., dissenting). The mechanism embodied in
the Minnesota statute was first examined and upheld in the New York case of Seidcer v. Roth,
17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). For a discussion of the Seider doc-
trine, see notes 32-38 and accompanying text infra.
8. 311 Minn. at 490, 245 N.w.2d at 630 (1976). Initially, the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that, for the purpose of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident, an
insurance company's obligation to defend and indemnify its insured constituted a garnishable res
under the Minnesota statute. Id. at 485, 245 N.W.2d at 268. Having found a proper res within
the forum state, the Minnesota court held that due process had not been violated by the statu-
tory procedure since it provided for proper notice to the defendant-insured, limited the
defendant-insured's liability to the value of the insurance policy, and only permitted state resi-
dents to have access to the process. 1d. at 488, 245 N.W.2d at 629. In reaching its conclusion,
the court emphasized 1) that the insurer was doing business within the forum; 2) that ordinarily
the insurer controls the litigation in accident situations; and 3) that the state has a legitimate
interest in providing its residents with a forum in which to litigate their claims. Id. at 487-88,
245 N.W.2d at 629.
9. 433 U.S. 902 (1977) (per curiam).
10. Id., citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For a discussion of Shaffer, see notes
48-52 and accompanying text infra.
11. 322 Minn. at 505, 272 N.W.2d at 893.
12. Id. To test compliance with Shaffer, the court examined "the relationship between the
defending parties, the litigation, and the forum state." Id. The court distinquished the garnish-
ment procedure utilized in Minnesota from the Delaware provision overturned in Shaffer on
the ground that the seized property in Savchuk was closely tied to the underlying cause of
action. Id. at 503, 272 N.V.2d at 892. As the court stated:'
[T]he insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify, while theoretically separable from the
tort action, has no indendent value or significance apart from the accident litigation. In
the accident litigation, however, it is inevitably the focus, determining the rights and
obligation of the insurer, the insured, and practically speaking the victim.
Id. (emphasis in original). Moreover, in support of its determination that the procedure was
constitutionally valid, the court relied heavily upon what it viewed to be a substantial state
interest in "facilitating recoveries for resident plaintiffs." Id. at 502-03, 272 N.W.2d at 891-92.
Furthermore, in characterizing the insured as a "nominal defendant" in the litigation, the court
emphasized the procedural similarity between the Minnesota garnishment statute and a statute
authorizing direct actions against the insurer, pointing out that both "serve to minimize the
traditional 'jurisdictional bias' in favor of the nominal defendant." Id. at 504-05, 272 N.WV.2d at
892-93.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Otis maintained that the obligation of the insurer to "le-
fend and indemnify" the insured was no more intimately related to the litigation than would be
a bank account available to satisfy the judgment. Id. at 506, 272 N.W.2d at 893-94 (Otis, J.,
[VOL. 25: p. 811
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holding that a state may not constitutionally exercise quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion over an insured defendant by garnishing the insurer's contractual obliga-
tion to defend and indemnify an insured who has no forum contacts. Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
Historically, a court's jurisdiction15 was based upon a sovereign state's
ability to control all persons and property present within its boundaries.'6
dissenting). Thus, Justice Otis concluded that under Shaffer, "[a]bsent a controversy involving
the policy which is justiciable in Minnesota, the mere happenstance of an asset such as insur-
ance being available to satisfy a judgment no longer confers in rem jurisdiction." Id. at 506, 272
N.W.2d at 894 (Otis, J., dissenting). Attacking what he considered to be the majority's mis-
placed emphasis on the forum's relationship with the plaintiff, Justice Otis would have required
that the constitutional analysis focus upon the defendant's contacts with the forum. Id. Given
the complete absence of contacts between the defendant and the State of Minnesota, Justice
Otis would have denied Minnesota's attempted exercise of jurisdiction over the litigation. 311
Minn. at 511, 272 N.W.2d at 896 (Otis, J., dissenting).
13. 444 U.S. at 322.
14. Id. at 333.
15. Traditionally, the judicial authority which a state may exert over the interests of persons
has been dissected into three distinct categories: in personam, in rem, and, more recently,
quasi in rem. In personam, or personal jurisdiction over an individual, allows a court of the
forum state to impose a personal liability or obligation upon one person in favor of another. See
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958). The state's authority to adjudicate such
claims is grounded in the defendant's relationship with the state. See International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). For a discussion of the development of due process
requirements with respect to a state's imposition of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents, see
notes 22-29 and accompanying text infra.
In rem jurisdiction empowers the forum court to determine the rights of all persons in
designated property. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 246 n. 12. Rooted in the physical power
of the state, this class of jurisdiction is dependent upon the presence of the subject matter
within the territorial boundaries of the forum. Id. at 246.
Finally, quasi in rem jurisdiction affects the interests of only particular persons in the
subject property, without imposing personal liability upon anyone. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 56-68, Introductory Note (1971). Proceedings quasi in rem may be
differentiated into two types:
In the first type, the plaintiff asserts an interest in a thing, and seeks to have his interest
established against the claim of a designated person or persons ...
In the second type of proceeding quasi in ren, the plaintiff does not assert that he
has [a direct] interest in the thing, but asserts a claim against the defendant personally
and seeks, by attachment or garnishment, to apply the thing to satisfaction of his claim
against the defendant.
Id. For the purposes of this note, reference to in rem jurisdiction will indicate a general classifi-
cation of judicial authority, including pure in ren and quasi in ren categories, unless specified
otherwise.
A state court's power to exercise jurisdiction over individuals or property is limited by two
concepts: 1) "jurisdiction," which is the scope of judicial authority that a state can exercise
consistent with the United States Constitution; and 2) "competence" or that portion of "jurisdic-
tion" which, through legislative mandate defines the state court's capacity to act. Smit, Comlnon
and Civil Law Rules of In Personain Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of Underlying
Policies, 21 INTL & Comp. L.Q. 335, 339 (1972). It should be noted that states, in defining the
competence of their courts, may confer less than the maximum constitutional power. Id. at
339-40.
16. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is
physical power"). The concept of physical power as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is a
creature of international law. D'Arcv v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 Howard) 165 (1850). More specif-
ically, two principles of international law provide the underlying foundation for the physical
power doctrine: 1) every nation possesses exclusive sovereignty over that which is within its
borders; and 2) a nation has no power beyond its territorial boundaries. J. STORY, COIMiEN-
TARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 539 (8th ed. 1883). The physical power theory of inter-
3
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Persons failing to comply with a command of the state court were subject to
arrest and imprisonment.' 7 Similarly, property could be seized and placed
under the court's authority through attachment.' 8
This control concept was incorporated into the demands of the due pro-
cess clause9 of the fourteenth amendment in Pennoyer v. Neff, 20 which
prohibited'any state from exercising in personam jurisdiction over persons
physically beyond that state's boundaries. 2 ! If an out-of-state defendant
national law has been applied to the states inter se. See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11
Howard) at 176.
For a discussion of the influence of British law on development of the "presence" concept,
see Werner, Dropping The Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented
Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565 (1979).
17. Werner, supra note 16, at 569-71.
18. Id. at 571. See J. STORY, supra note 16, § 550.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause provides that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 1d. As the Su-
preme Court has stated: "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a
limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of
nonresident defendants." Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
20. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
21. Id. at 736. Neff, a nonresident, was sued in an Oregon state court by Mitchell to re-
cover money due the latter for the performance of legal services. Id. at 719. Pursuant to an
Oregon statute, service of process was made by publication. Id. at 720. After Neff failed to
appear and after a default judgment was entered against him, Mitchell placed a levy on a plot of
land in Oregon owned by the defendant. Id. at 719-20. Pennoyer acquired title to the land
through purchase at a sheriffs sale. Id. at 719.
Subsequently, Neff instituted an action in ejectment in federal court against Pennoyer,
alleging that the judgment rendered against Neff was void for want to personal service of pro-
cess and that, consequently, the sheriffs sale and Pennoyer's title were void. Id. at 719-20. The
district court found the default judgment invalid because of defects in the publication. Id. at
720.
While disagreeing with the reasoning of the lower court's opinion, the Sureme Court af-
firmed the judgment. Id. at 736. The court began its analysis with a discussion of "two well-
established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state over
persons and property." Id. at 722. These principles, the Court explained, were 1) that "every
state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its ter-
ritory," and 2) that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory." Id. In line with the second principle, the Court pointed out that
[i]f, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte against non-
residents and absent parties, upon mere publication of process, which, in the great major-
ity of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested, could be upheld and en-
forced, they would be the constant instruments of fraud and oppression.
Id. at 726. The Court went on to conclude that, without jurisdiction at the commencement of
the action, regardless of subsequent events, a court may not render a valid judgment. Id. at
728.
Turning its attention to the fourteenth amendment, the Court recognized that the due
process clause permits attacks on the validity of judgments and their attempted enforement on
the basis of lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 733. The Court defined due process "when applied to
judicial proceedings" to mean "a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and prin-
ciples which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and en-
forcement of private rights." Id. Jurisdiction in a case involving a determination of personal
liability was predicated on "service of process within the State, or [a] voluntary appearance." Id.
For an analysis of the Pennoyer decision, see Comment, Jurisdiction in Rem and the Attachment
of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, 726-28. For a discussion of
the influence of Pennoyer on modern jurisdictional analysis, see generally Hazzard, A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 245-48.
[ OL. 25: p. 811
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owned property within the state, however, Pennoyer permitted the state to
exert its authority over the subject property and to apply such property to
satisfy a plaintiff's claim. 22  In so doing, the Pennoyer Court perpetuated a
dualism in jurisdictional analysis, 23 reaffirming the utility of in rem rules as
an alternative mode of exercising judicial power.
24
The in personam branch of the dual standard was further examined in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,25 where the Supreme Court an-
nounced a new jurisdictional approach based on an analysis of the nature and
quality of the defendant's activities in relation to the forum state.26 Under
22. 95 U.S. at 723. The Court recognized that an admittedly valid exercise of jurisdiction by
a state "will often affect persons and property without it." Id. After noting the acceptability of
such extraterritorial effect, the Court went on to point out:
Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them,
it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any property
owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the
State's jurisdicion over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its
tribunals can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens ....
Id. Such actions, the Court observed, are "substantially proceedings in rein" in which service
by publication may be sufficient to inform the parties of the nature of the proceedings. Id. at
727. The Court noted that this was so because
[tihe law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, in person or by
agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him, not only that it is
taken into the custody of the Court, but that he must look to any proceedings authorized
by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale.
Id. Thus, the Court concluded, unless property is initially seized by a court, substituted service
is not sufficient. Id.
23. This dichotomy was actually present in American law long before the decision in Pen-
noyer v. Neff. See, e.g., Kibbe v. Kibbe, 119, 126 (Conn. 1786); Bissel v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 461,
467-68 (1813). Even after Pennoyer, the in rem/in personam distinction continued. See Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958). But cf.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1949) ("the requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for
which the standards are so elusive and confused"); note 29 infra.
24. 95 U.S. at 723, 727. See Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconsti-
tutional, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 668, 668-70 (1975). Professor Zammit notes that "[w]hile Justice
Field did not invent the dichotomy of jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in personam, [in Pen-
noyer v. Neff] he raised them to a level of constitutional significance which they neither previ-
ously enjoyed nor, perhaps, deserved." Id. at 668. See also Smit, The Enduring Utility of In
Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600, 601-03 (1977).
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). At issue was the constitutionality of a Washington State statute
which, in the context of an action to collect delinquent contributions to the state unemployment
fund, authorized extraterritorial service of process against a foreign corporation. Id. at 312. The
corporation being sued, a shoe manufacturer, employed Washington residents to exhibit sam-
ples and to solicit orders in Washington. Id. at 314. Any orders obtained were transmitted to
the corporation's St. Louis office for acceptance or rejection. Id.
26. Id. at 319. See Van Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1143 (1966). Because a corporation could have no actual
physical presence within a state, legal fictions were created which, for jurisdictional purposes,
situated a corporation wherever it had "consented" to suit or was "present." See Kurland, The
Supreme Court. The Due Process Clause and In Personais Jurisdiction of State Courts-Fromn
Pennoyer to Denckla. 25 U. CHS. L. REV. 569, 577-83 (1958). Under the "'consent" theory,
because a foreign entity could carry on business activities within a forum state only with the
state's permission, the state retained the power to require, as a condition for the granting of
such permission, that the corporation appoint an agent to receive service in the state. Id. at
578. The "presence" model allowed service on a foreign corporation in the absence of consent
when the nature of its activities within the forum established that it was present there. Id. at
582-83. As long as the corporation was found to be present within the forum, it was open to suit
1979-1980
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this approach, due process is satisfied when a state exercises personal juris-
diction over a nonresident who has "certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "27 The effect of International Shoe was to
allow the forum court to exercise jurisdiction when it had determined that
compelling the defendant to litigate away from his residence was not un-
reasonable. 28  Following International Shoe, a line of Supreme Court cases
more clearly delineated the parameters of the minimum contacts rule by
requiring a sufficient relationship among the defendant, the litigation, and
the forum state before that state could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction.2 9
on any claims against it, regardless of whether they arose directly out of the specific activities
being conducted there. 1d. at 583. The application of either theory, however, created difficulties
because, in determining whether a corporation was present, or in implying consent, it became
necessary to determine if the corporation was doing business within the forum. Id. at 584.
The Court in International Shoe took the first step in resolving these difficulties when it
held that due process is satisfied if the corporation has such contacts with the forum state that it
is reasonable to require it to defend a suit away from its home state. 326 U.S. at 317. The Court
concluded that the maintenance of a suit against a foreign corporation which "systematically and
continuously" employed salesmen to convass orders in the forum state satisfied this standard.
Id. at 320. Additionally, the Court noted that the defendant's obligations, which were the sub-
ject of the suit, arose directly out of its activities taking place within the forum. 1d. The nature
and degree of contacts required to satisfy this standard were more fully developed in sub-
sequent case law. See Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Pro-
cess, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 381 (1955); note 29 and accompanying text infra.
27. 326 U.S. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
28. 326 U.S. at 319. The Court concluded that the foreign corporation involved in the case
before it was not unreasonably burdened by having to litigate in the forum state:
[To the extent that a corporation exercises the privileges of conducting activities within a
state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of the state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue.
Id. (citations omitted). In finding that the assertion of judicial authority was reasonable, how-
ever, the Court did not enumerate which factors tinder its balancing test were determinative.
See Developments in the Late-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 924 (1960). But
at least one commentator has concluded the emphasis rested mainly on the defendant's burdens
in litigating away from its place of residence:
[T]he process of determining the constitutionality of the forum's assertion of jurisdiction
over the defendant involves the balancing of certain interests against the inconvenience to
the defendant. . . . Like the defendant, the plaintiff has a legitimate interest, for example,
in not being put to undue expense in litigating a claim, though this interest without more
has not been considered sufficient to require the defendant to appear. Further, a state has
an interest in providing a forum for the effectuation of its protective or regulatory policies,
but this interest in itself is again usually said to be insufficient.
Id.
29. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla. 327 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Traveler's
Health Assoc. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1952). A discernible trend "toward expanding the
permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and nonresidents" became appar-
ent. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 222. In McGee, the Supreme Court
found that due process requirements were satisfied where jurisdiction over a nonresident was
based on performance of a single act having a "substantial connection" with the forum. Id. at
223. In finding a single contact sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction, the Court noted
that "modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in such economic activity." Id. As a result of
6
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Because of this bifturcation of jurisdictional theory into in rem and in
personam branches, and because International Shoe and its progeny dealt
exclusively with the constitutional prerequisites of personal jurisdiction,30
the "territorial power" standard articulated in Pennoyer retained its applica-
bility to in rem situations. 3 1  One instance in which Pennoyer rules con-
tinued to provide the basis for the assertion of in rem authority may be
found in Seider v. Roth. 32 In Seider, two New York residents, husband and
wife, brought suit against a nonresident in a New York state court to recover
for injuries suffered in an automobile accident in Vermont. 33  Unable to
the expansive interpretation of "minimum contacts" developed in McGee, it appeared that the
Court was shifting toward a more plaintiff-oriented perspective. See Van Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 26, at 1121. Note, supra note 26, at 399.
The widening reach of the International Shoe standard as developed in McGee was some-
what restrained a year later in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In reaffirming the spirit
of Pennoyer and seemingly reemphasizing the International Shoe tcus on the defendant, the
Hanson Court cautioned that it was "a mistake to assume that [the post-International Shoe]
trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts"
because such restrictions are "a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the re-
spective states." Id. at 251 (citation omitted). In Hanson, a domiciliary of Delaware appointed a
Delaware trust company as trustee of certain securities situated in Delaware. Id. at 238. After
resettling in Florida, however, the settler executed an inter vivos instrument entitling selected
beneficiaries, all residents of Florida, to receive $400,000 from the original trusts. Id. at 239. At
the time of her death, controversy arose between the designated beneficiaries and the legatees
of the settlor's will who maintained that the inter vivos power of appointment was invalid. Id. at
240. The defendant-beneficiaries moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the Florida court
lacked jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee. Id. at 241. Discovering no acts in the record
similar to that which had occurred in McGee, the Court rejected Florida's exercise of juris-
diction, stating: "It is esential in each case that there may be some act hv which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protection of the law." Id. at 253 (emphasis added). Rather than
interpret Hanson as a return to the pro-defendant analysis under International Shoe, however,
one commentator has suggested that the case may be read narrowly-i.e., that the Hanson
decision merely reflects the Court's distaste for "an unpalatable Florida choice of law rule." See
Zammit, supra note 24 at 677. See also Phillips v. Arthur Hocking Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256-57,
413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966).
In any event, many states have adopted a broad view of the limits oil personal jurisdiction
by effectuating "long-arm statutes" designed, in some instances, to stretch the competence of
state courts to their constitutional limits. See Zammit, supra note 24 at 674-75. See also note 15
supra. For a thorough discussion of the imposition of personal jurisdiction under state long-
arm statutes, see Note, In Personamn Jurisdiction over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product
Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1965). But cf. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen,
444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Supreme Court rejected Oklahoma's attempt to exercise in personam juris-
diction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its distrubutor in a products liability action
when the defendants' sole contact with the forum state was the fact that an automobile sold in
New York to New York residents was involved in an accident in Oklahoma). For a discussion of
World-Wide Volkswagen, see notes 92-94 infra.
30. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
31. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197-205 (1977). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958) (recognizing that in rem jurisdiction is based upon the presence of the subject
property within the state); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966) (holding that the underlying obligation to indemnify under an insurance policy provides
"physically present" property upon which to base the assertion of jurisdiction). See generally
Reese, Shaffer v. Heitner: Implication For the Doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 63 IowA L. REV.
1023, 1023; Comment, supra note 21, at 737; Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner-If International
Shoe Fits, Attach It, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 308, 318 (1978).
32. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
33. Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
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acquire personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the plaintiffs
essayed quasi in rem jurisdiction 34 by attaching as a debt the obligation of
the defendant's insurer, who was doing business in New York, to defend and
indemnify the defendant-insured.3 5  In upholding this exercise of juris-
diction, the New York Court of Appeals implicitly followed the 1905 case of
Harris v. Balk,36 in which the Supreme Court held that an intangible could
provide the res necessary to establish quasi in rein jurisdiction in any state
that was able to serve personally the garnishee within its boundaries.
3 7
Seider carried this legal fiction to its logical conclusion by allowing garnish-
ment of the insurance company's inchoate obligation under an automobile
liability insurance policy in order to furnish the jurisdictional foundation for
the court's exercise of power over the insured.3 8  Almost immediately, the
34. Plaintiffs were attempting to exert the second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
insured. See note 15 supra.
35. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100. The pertinent New York
statutory provision states that "[a]ny debt or property against which a money judgment may be
enforced as provided in section 5201 is subject to attachment." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6202
(McKinney 1980). Section 5201 provides in part: "A money judgment may be enforced against
any debt, which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the
judgment debtor, whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or
nonresident. ... Id. § 5201(a) (McKinney 1978). The court in Seider held that the contractual
obligation of an insurance company to its insured under a liability insurance policy represented
a debt within the meaning of § 5201, and thus, was subject to attachment under § 6202. 17
N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
In a forceful dissent, Judge Burke maintained that the Seider majority had engaged in
"circular ratiocination" by grounding jurisdiction upon a promise to indemnify which would not
mature into a debt until a civil suit was validly commenced. Id. at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269
N.Y.S.2d at 103 (Burke, J., dissenting). This statutory flaw was also perceived in other juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vermont 1970); Javorek v. Superior
Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); DeRentis v. Lewis, 106 R.I.
240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969).
36. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). In Harris, a Maryland resident, Epstein, sought to recover money
owed to him by Balk, a resident of North Carolina. Id. at 216. Since Balk would not set foot in
Maryland, Epstein sought to satisfy his claim by garnishing a debt owed to Balk by a third
party. Id. While the third party was temporarily present in Maryland, Epstein served the writ
of garnishment on him. Id.
37. Id. at 222. The Supreme Court, in sustaining Maryland jurisdiction, held that "[t]he
obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes." Id.
Thus, whenever the garnishee was physically present in the forum, even if only transitorily so,
Harris allowed the exercise of quasi in rem power over the debt. Id. The assignment of a
location to an intangible obligation in Harris was an example of a legal fiction created by the
Court in order to facilitate application of "physical power" jurisdictional rules under Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See notes 19-24 and accompanying text supra.
38. 17 N.Y.2d at 114-15, 216 N.E.2d at 314-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. One result of the
Seider court's expansion of Harris is that the corporate garnishee, unlike the individual debtor,
may be "doing business" and, thus, be "present" for jurisdictional purposes in multiple forums.
See Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and The Interstate Corpora-
tion, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 564 (1967).
The Seider doctrine has been restricted in reach, however, in two notable respects. First,
subsequent case law has limited utilization of the procedure to resident plaintiffs only. See
Farrel v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969)
("we are convinced that the constitutional doubt with respect to applying Seider v. Roth in favor
of nonresidents would be exceedingly serious"); Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366
N.E.2d 253, 307 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977) ("this special type of contract duty ...is not of sufficient
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Seider doctrine was greeted with a wave of vociferous judicial3 9 and scho-
larly disapproval.
40
Nevertheless, shortly after this decision, the New York Court of Appeals
sustained the constitutional validity of the Seider doctrine in Simpson v.
Loehmann. 41  The Simpson court explicitly acknowledged Seider's substan-
tial reliance on the reasoning in Harris, concluding that "the presence of the
debt in this state-contingent or inchoate though it may be-represents
sufficient of a property right [2sic] in the defendant to furnish the nexus
with, and the interest in, New York to empower its courts to exercise an in
rem jurisdiction over him." 42  Rather than adopt Harris and its emphasis on
the "physical power" jurisdictional construct as the sole basis for its decision,
however, the Simpson majority, in light of recent trends in the area of per-
sonal jurisdiction,4 3 undertook "a reasonable and practical evaluation of the
respective rights of the plaintiffs, defendants, and the State in terms of fair-
substance to support quasi in rem jurisdiction where the plaintiff is a nonresident"). But see id.
at 146, 366 N.E.2d at 257, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (Jasen, J., concurring) (maintaining that Seider
in its present form "constitute[s] an unconstitutional discrimination in favor of local residents").
The second limitation restricted recovery under Seider to the face value of the insurance
policy, even though the defendant proceeded to litigate on the merits. See Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 991, 238 N.E.2d 319, 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (1968) (per
curiam). In effect, then, the Simpson court fashioned a limited appearance rule in the face of a
New York statute which provided that a defendant appearing in a quasi in rem proceeding was
subject to personal authority. See Civil Practice Law and Rules, ch. 308, § 320(c), 1962 N.Y.
Laws 1297. Subsequently, to obviate the anomaly, the applicable statutory provision was
amended to create a statutory limited appearance procedure. See N.Y. Ci\'. PRAc. LAwV
3 20(c)(1) (McKinney 1972).
39. See, e.g., Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 13L Cal. Rptr. 768
(1976); Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978); Hart v.
Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219 (Law Div. 1976); DeRentis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240,
258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Housley v.
Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967). Only two other states subsequently insti-
tuted the Seider-type procedure. Minnesota's statutory provision which fully incorporated the
process was held unconstitutional in Savchuk v. Rush, 444 U.S. at 332. For the text of the
Minnesota prejudgment garnishment procedure, see note 4 supra. New Hampshire abides by
Seider only when the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would be reasonable.
Camire v. Scieska, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976). When the defendant is a resident of a
state that has adopted Seider-type procedure, assertion of New Hamphire judicial authority is
found to be reasonable. Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction over NonResidents-Newv York
Goes Wild, 35 INs. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insur-
ance, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1968); Comment, supra note 38; Comment, Quasi in Rein
Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654 (1967); Note, supra note 21;
53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108 (1968).
41. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), rehearing denied 21 N.Y.2d
990, 234 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam). The facts in Simpson were strik-
ingly similar to those in Seider. A resident plaintiff was injured when he was lacerated by the
propellor of a boat owned by the defendant, a Connecticut resident, while in Connecticut. 21
N.Y.2d at 308, 234 N.E.2d at 670, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 634. The plaintiff, with his father, initiated a
negligence suit in New York, obtaining jurisdiction by attaching a liability policy issued to the
defendant by an insurance company doing business in the forum state. id.
42. 21 N.Y.2d at 310, 284 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citation omitted). See notes
36-38 and accompanying text supra.
43. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
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ness." 44  In concluding that the Seider rule also conformed to overall stan-
dards of fairness, the Simpson court emphasized that 1) the insured's burden
was minimal since the insurer realistically controlled all aspects of the litiga-
tion; and 2) the state of New York had an important interest in the litigation
by virtue of its relations with the resident plaintiff and the insurer which was
present in, and strictly regulated by, the state.
45
Although only cursorily considered in Simpson, an alternative method of
upholding Seider's constitutional validity involved viewing the procedure as
a "judicially created direct action statute."' 46  Under this approach, the con-
44. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The Simpson court noted
that "[s]uch an evaluation requires a practical appraisal of the situation of the various parties
rather than an emphasis upon somewhat magical and medieval concepts of presence and
power." Id.
Other courts had also applied the International Shoe reasonableness test to in rem actions,
thereby foreshadowing the demise of the in personam/in rem dichotomy. See, e.g., Mullane v.
Central Hanover Tnst Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316
P.2d 960 (1957). In Mullane the Supreme Court articulated its difficulty in rationalizing this
distinction in treatment: "[W]e think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so
elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do
vary from state to state." 339 U.S. at 312.
In Atkinson, Justice Traynor applied the "minimum contacts" standard to an in rem action,
concluding that "the solution must be sought in the general principles governing jurisdiction
over persons and property rather than in an attempt to assign a fictional situs to intangibles." 49
Cal.2d at 345, 316 P.2d at 964. See also Canire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976);
Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219 (Law Div. 1976). Federal Courts had also
joined the trend toward a uniform jurisdictional approach. See, e.g., United States Indus. v.
Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976); Jonet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Gibbons, J., concurring).
45. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The Simpson court's affir-
mance of Seider's constitutional validity, however, was somewhat less than a unanimous deci-
sion. See id. at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640 (Breitel, J., concurring); id. at 316,
234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 642 (Burke, J., dissenting), Judge Breitel, concurring only
in result, lashed out at the "theoretical unsoundness of the Seider case," hoping by his com-
ments "to hasten the day of its overruling or its annulment by legislation." Id. at 314, 234
N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640 (Breitel, J., concurring). See also Donawitz v. Danek, 42
N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977) (upholding the Seider-type procedure
uncomfortably only because of "considerations of institutional stability and mandates of stare
decisis").
46. Direct action statutes permit an injured party to bring suit directly against an insurer
while its obligation to the insured is contingent. One example is the Louisiana direct action
statute, which provides in pertinent part:
The injured person . . . shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within
the terms and limits of the policy. . . . This right of direct action shall exist whether the
policy oi insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not
and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, pro-
vided the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (%Vest 1978). The validity of this statutory procedure was con-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954). In Watson, a Louisiana plaintiff, injured in Louisiana, brought suit directly against the
nonresident tortfeasor's liability insurer under the state's direct action statute. Id. at 67. In
upholding the provision's constitutionality in the face of a due process challenge, the Court
found that Louisiana had a substantial interest in safeguarding the rights of individuals who
were harmed within its borders. Id. at 68. Moreover, the Court emphasized the heavy burden
on the plaintiff who "but for the direct action law, could not get her case tried without going to
Massachusetts or Illinois although she lives in Louisiana and her claim is for injuries from a
product bought and used there." Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
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tacts that the insurer had with the forum were attributed to the defendant-
insured, making such a procedure fair to both the insurer, who is subject to
in personam jurisdiction within the forum, and to the insured, who is consid-
ered only a "nominal defendant" in the proceeding.
47
Seider appeared to have weathered the storm of criticism leveled
against it until its analytical framework was again shaken by the Supreme
Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.48 In Shaffer, the Court conclusively
eliminated the last existing remnants of Pennoyer-type judicial authority by
holding that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction [whether in personam,
in rein, or quasi in rein] must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 49  In so ruling, however, the
Court observed that the "presence of property within a State [might] bear
on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State,
the defendant, and the litigation." 5 0  While recognizing that jurisdiction
47. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (1968), aff'd on rehearing, 410 F.2d 117 (2d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). See also l)onawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138,
366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977). In Minichiello, Judge Friendly, writing for the court,
initially concluded that a statutory provision prescribing a direct action against insurers doing
business in the state of New York in favor of residents or those injured there could constitution-
ally have been enacted by the legislature. 410 F.2d at 110. Turning to the validity of the
Seider-type procedure uinder which, unlike in a direct action, the insured is the named defend-
ant, Judge Friendly found the insured's burden to be purely "nominal" and insufficient to
violate due process standards. Id. at 110-13. Judge Friendly expressly rejected the argument
that a quasi in rein judgment in New York might be given collateral estoppel effect in other
states, thereby exposing the insured to potential personal liability. Id. at 112.
Interestingly, although the Minichiello court did not even mention Harris v. Balk in sup-
port of Seider, on rehearing en banc, the court placed substantial reliance on the Harris deci-
sion, refusing to concentrate more heavily upon the defendant-insured than it had in its panel
decision. 410 F.2d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 1978).
48. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). At issue in Shaffer was whether a state's assertion of (jtiasi in rem
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the minimum contacts standards of International
Shoe. Id. at 207-12. A nonresident of Delaware filed a shareholder's derivative suit against,
inter alios, certain former or present corporate officers, all nonresidents. Id. at 189-91. A se-
questration order was issued pursant to a Delaware statutory procedure which enabled the
forum court to seize all of the individual defendants' Delaware property-including stocks and
other intangibles-in order to establish quasi in rein jurisdiction over the individual defendants.
Id. at 191-92. The defendants, after service by certified mail, entered a special appearance to
quash service and to vacate the sequestration order, contending that the Delaware procedure
violated due process of law. Id. at 192-93.
49. Id. at 212. In conclusively expanding the "minimum contacts" analysis to incorporate in
rein jurisdictional theory, the Shaffer Court observed that, generally, in rein assertions of judi-
cial authority represent indirect means of obtaining power over the individual. Id. at 207. As
the Court remarked: "This recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise
of jurisdiction in rein, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising 'juris-
diction over the interests of persons in a thing.' " Id., quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAVS § 56, Introductory Note (1971). For an extensive list of commentary on the
Shaffer decision and its impact, see Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant For The
Transient Rule of In Personami Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 47 n.59 (1980). But ef. Siait,
The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal?, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 519 (1979)
(contending that "Shaffer's claim to fame is minimal").
A related area that has undergone a great deal of examination after Shaffer is the transient
rule of in personam jurisdiction which had traditionally allowed imposition of personal juris-
diction whenever the nonresident was present, even if only temporarily, within the forum. See
generally Bernstine, supra.
50. 433 U.S. at 207. The Court's tripartite analysis concentrated especially upon the contacts
of the defendant with the forum. Id. The validity of such an analysis was reinforced in a sub-
1979-1980
11
Goldstein: Civil Procedure - Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction - Assertion of Quasi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REV1EW [ 2
may ordinarily be exercised in the state where the property which is the
source of the underlying controversy is located, 5 1 Shaffer tolled the death
knell for cases like Harris in which property wholly unrelated to the plain-
tiff's cause of action furnished the exclusive basis for the exercise of juris-
diction. 
52
Post-Shaffer cases stniggled with the question of Seider's continuing va-
lidity, many interpreting it as a quasi in rem action rooted in the now over-
turned Harris decision. 53  Other cases, however, have upheld the Seider
procedure, viewing it as a "sui generis" form of jurisdiction essentially corn-
patible with the recently delineated Shaffer standards. 54 The United States
sequent decision in which the Supreme Court held that, despite strong state interests in exer-
cising jurisdiction, minimum contacts (lid not exist where the nonresident's sole relation to the
forum state was the fact that he had permitted his daughter to live and attend school there. See
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
51. 433 U.S. at 207. The Court noted that both pure in rein actions and quasi in rein
actions of the first type would fall within this category. Id. at 207 n.24. See note 15 supra.
Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction is likely to be deemed proper under Shaffer, not only when
property is the subject of the dispute, but also when the cause of action is "otherwise related to
rights and duties growing out of ownership." 433 U.S. at 208. As the Court concluded: "[Jiuris-
diction over many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rein would not be
affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the International
Shoe standard." Id. (footnote omitted).
52. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39. The Court effectively destroyed the underlying foundations of
quasi in rein jurisdiction of the second type, holding that "[i]f ...other ties [with the forum]
did not exist, cases over which the State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be
brought in that forum." Id. at 209. See note 15 supra. The Shaffer Court repudiated the prim-
ary justification for such jurisdiction-i.e., that a wrongdoer should not be permitted to avoid
claims by removing his assets to a place where he is not subject to personal jurisdiction-
because 1) no effort is ever made, in asserting jurisdiction, to determine the motivation of the
owner in placing the property in the forum; and 2) in any event, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause renders a valid in personam judgment enforceable in all states. 433 U.S. at 210. In
rejecting an argument that the "presence" standard was more certain and manageable, the
Court concluded that "when the existence of jurisdiction in a particular forum under Interna-
tional Shoe is unclear, the cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional ques-
tion may be the sacrifice of 'fair play and substantial justice.' That cost is too high." Id. at 211.
For a discussion of the "presence" standard, see note 26 supra.
53. See, e.g., Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Hutchinson v. Hayes Bros., N.Y.L.J. Mar. 17, 1978, at 4, col. 2 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct.);
Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Kings County Sup. Ct. 1977); Kennedy
v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Fulton County Sup. Ct. 1977). The court in
Torres was unable to separate the Seider procedure from its Harris underpinnings: "Harris was
the seed from which Seider evolved and it provided the roots through which Seider was
nourished. Thus, since the seed has been pulled and its roots have been severed from the
fertile field of legal precedent by Shaffer, Seider's viability has likewise been quashed." 457 F.
Supp. at 475. Moreover, the court rejected a direct action statute interpretation because it
believed Seider to hold that the appearance of such an action against the insurer represented
only an "effect" of the attachment process once quasi in rein jurisdiction had first been validly
obtained. Id. at 470. For a discussion of the direct action statute approach, see notes 46-47 and
accompanying text supra.
54. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978); Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978)
(per curiam); Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1978); Rodriguez v. Wolfe,
93 Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Queens County Sup. Ct. 1978). These cases focused upon
the fact that the primary risks and burdens of defense fall on the insurer who is subject to
personal jurisdiction within the forum, and also upon the fact that the imposition of judicial
authority does not constitutionally burden the insured who has only a nominal role in the pro-
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp.,55 for example, approved the Seider-type attachment procedure by
differentiating it from quasi in rem actions typified by Harris.56  Having
distinguished Harris, the O'Connor court concluded that due process was
satisfied because 1) the insurer, subject to personal jurisdiction under Inter-
national Shoe, was, in effect, the real party in interest, 57 and 2) the named
defendant, the insured, was only inconsequentially burdened by the litiga-
tion. 58 The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari in O'Connor 5 a
in the face of a vigorous dissent by Justice Powell who expressed his sub-
stantial concern over the "serious questions of due process" posed by the
Seider doctrine.
60
ceedings. See cases cited supra. It should be noted, however, that the New York courts, in
giving continued life to Seider, did not wholly accept its theoretical basis. In Baden, for exam-
ple, the court upheld Seider primarily on principles of stare decisis: "The practical effect of the
[Seider] rule is so insignificant that, in this instance, there is validity in the aphorism, always to
be charily applied, that it is more important that the law be settled than that it be settled
correctly.' " 45 N.Y.2d at 892, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
55. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). In O'Connor a New York
resident brought suit against a foreign corporation for the wrongful death of her husband result-
ing from an industrial accident against a foreign corporation. Id. at 196-97. To acquire jurisdic-
tion, plaintiff attached the obligations of two insurance companies doing business in the forum
to defend and indemnify the defendant corporation. Id. at 197. The Second Circuit, in its
O'Connor opinion, had joined three other cases involving similar legal issues. Id. at 196.
56. Id. at 198-99. The O'Connor court pointed out that unlike Harris-type cases in which a
defendant is deprived of property (i.e., the debt) that is owned him, "a Seider judgment would
simply mean that liability policies, on which appellants could not have realized for any purpose
other than to protect themselves against losses to others, will be applied to the very objective
for which they were procured." Id. at 199, quoting Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 117, 118
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Beyond this, the Second Circuit
found that "since the insurance policy was purchased to protect against the type of liability
which is subject of the lawsuit, and since the obligation to defend clearly encompassed the
litigation," the Seider-type procedure did not involve jurisdiction based upon property "com-
pletely unrelated" to the cause of action. 579 F.2d at 199.
57. 579 F.2d at 199. The Second Circuit reasoned that because the insurer was in total
control of the litigation and because the impending judgment was limited to the value of the
policy, the due process analysis tinder Shaffer must primarily stress the contacts between the
forum and the foreign insurer. Id. Finding the insurance company to be doing business in New
York and, thus, subject to personal jurisdiction in actions against it, the O'Connor court con-
cluded that the exercise of Seider-type jurisdiction was not unreasonable. Id. at 201.
58. Id. at 198-202. The court summarily dismissed as highly improbable any likelihood that
other states would give a Seider-type judgment collateral estoppel effect which would submit
the insured to personal liability beyond the policy limits without the opportunity to defend his
claim. Id. at 201-02. Additionally, the Second Circuit was aware of no instances where the
problems predicted to arise after New York's adoption of Seider had actually occurred, such as
the inability or refusal of the insured to appear in the forum for deposition or trial, the failure to
assert a counterclaim, or the existence of multiple claims exceeding the policy limits. Id. at 202.
Nevertheless, the O'Connor court was careful to constrain its holding to the cases before it,
stating, "we are not saying that a case where such application might violate dne process could
never arise.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
59. 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
60. Id. at 1038. Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Powell's memorandum opinion. Id. at
1034. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell maintained that factors traditionally considered
tinder the doctrine'of forum non conveniens-such as difficulties involved in litigating in a
forum far removed from the site of the injury-should be incorporated into the due process
clause. Id. at 1037 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, in the Seider situation, these factors might
work to defeat the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. Justice Powell also took issue with the Second
1979-1980
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Against this historical background, the Rush Court 61 proceeded to
examine the constitutional validity of the Minnesota garnishment statute
62
and Seider rule 63 embodied therein. 64  Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, began by noting that the sole "affiliating circumstance" offered to
demonstrate a jurisdictionally significant relationship between Rush, Min-
nesota, and the litigation was that Rush's insurer did business in the forum
state. 65 While recognizing that under Seider this factor alone would permit
a court to exercise jurisdiction,6 6 Justice Marshall, applying Shaffer and In-
ternational Shoe, viewed the preserve of the intangible property as a single
factor to be considered in reviewing the contacts between the defendant and
the state.6 7 Finding that no additional ties were suggested from the in-
surer's presence, the Court concluded that the insured's inability to control
his insurer's decision to transact business within the forum effectively dis-
pelled any notion that "the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity related
to the forum that would make the imposition of jurisdiction fair, just, or
reasonable." 6  Moreover, Justice Marshall did not perceive any relationship
between the litigation and the forum sufficient to sustain an exercise of
jurisdiction, observing that the liability policy could neither be considered
the subject of the dispute nor be deemed to be related to the underlying
negligence action. 69 Finally, Justice Marshall reasoned that the attached
Circuit's characterization of the insured as a "nominal defendant," recognizing that he will be
required to participate in his defense and will encounter the inconveniences resulting from
having to litigate in a foreign court. Id. at 1037-38 (Powell, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
Powell pointed to the risk of insurance judgments exceeding the limits of the insurance policy,
thereby exposing the insured to the burden and expense of a second trial. Id. at 1038 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
61. justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens filed separate dissenting opinions.
62. For the text of the Minnesota garnishment statute, see note 4 supra.
63. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
64. 444 U.S. at 325-33.
65. Id. at 328.
66. Id. The Rush Court described the Seider procedure as "an ingenious jurisdictional
theory [designed] to permit a State to command a defendant to appear in its courts on the basis
of the fact that the defendant's insurer does business in the forum. Id. The Court explained the
Seider approach as follows:
The legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for garnishment ptirposes, wherever
the debtor is found is combined with the legal fictioni that a corporation is "present," for
jurisdictional purposes wherever it does business to yield the conclusion that the obliga-
tion to defend and indemnify is located in the forum for purposes of the garnishment
statute. The fictional presence of the policy obligation is deemed to give the State the
power to determine the policyholder's liability for the out-of-state accident.
Id. (footnote omitted). See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
67. 444 U.S. at 328. See notes 25-29 & 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
68. 444 U.S. at 329 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The Court noted that State
Farm's determination to conduct business in Minnesota was "completely adventitious" as far as
Rush was concerned. Id. Further, the Court found it "unlikely" that, by purchasing insurance,
Rush purposefully "subjected himself to suit in any State to which a potential future plaintiff
might decide to move." Id.
69. Id. The Court in Shaffer had recognized that minimum contacts ard ordinarily present
when the dispute directly involves the property within the forum. See 433 U.S. at 207; notes
50-52 and accompanying text supra. In finding that the liability policy failed to provide suffi-
cient contacts with the forum state to satisfy the requirements of Shaffer, the Rush Court
[VOL. 25: p. 811
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"property" in Seider-type cases-i.e., the obligation to indemnify the
insured -lacked jurisdictional significance altogether since an insurer con-
ducting business nationally would be fictionally "present" in all fifty states at
once.
7 0
Justice Marshall then addressed the validity of the direct action analogy
employed to sustain the Seider-type procedure in Minichiello v. Rosen-
berg.71 Distinguishing Seider-type situations from actual direct action stat-
utes,72 Justice Marshall reasoned that because jurisdiction over the insurer
as garnishee could only be achieved through the nonresident insured, estab-
lishment of the state's power over the insured became "analytically prerequi-
site" to any attempt to assert jurisdiction against his insurer. 73  Moreover, in
support of his conclusion that judicial authority over the nonresident was not
inconsequential, Justice Marshall pointed out the substantial stake such a
defendant would have in the adjudication of his liability.
74
The Court also repudiated the attempt by the Minnesota court to estab-
lish the requisite minimum contacts between Rush and the forum by ag-
gregating the forum contacts of both defending parties.75  Observing that
such a result would unconstitutionally permit assertion of jurisdiction over
Rush based on his insurance company's contacts with the state, Justice Mar-
shal concluded that "[t]he requirements of International Shoe .. must be
observed that "[t]he contractual arrangements between the defendant and the insurer pertain
only to conduct, not the substance, of the litigation, and accordingly do not affect the court's
jurisdiction unless they demonstrate ties between the defendant and the forum." 444 U.S. at
329.
70. Id. at 330. As a result of this realization, Justice Marshall concluded that "the fictitious
presence of the insurer's obligation in Minnesota does not, without more, provide a basis for
concluding that there is any contact in the International Shoe sense between Minnesota and the
insured." Id. (emphasis in original).
71. See id. at 330-31. For a discussion of Minichiello, see note 47 supra.
72. 444 U.S. at 330-31. Justice Marshall referred to the Louisiana direct action statute which
was upheld in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). For text of the
Louisiana statute and a discussion of Watson, see note 46 supra. Justice Marshall recognized
that Watson limited the reach of the statute to those instances in which the cause of action arose
within the forum or the insured was a resident there. 444 U.S. at 331 n.19. Furthermore,
Justice Marshall noted that the Louisiana provision allowed the plaintiff to proceed directly
against the insurer, without making the insured a defendant in the action, Id.
73. 444 U.S. at 330-01.
74. Id. at 331 & n.20. Justice Marshall, in rejecting the characterization of the insured as a
nominal defendant, explained the substantial interests which such a party would have in the
litigation:
A party does not extinguish his legal interest in a. dispute by insuring himself against
having to pay an eventual judgment out of his own pocket. Moreover, the purpose of
insurance is simply to make the defendant whole for the economic costs of the lawsuit;
but noneconomic factors may also be important to the defendant. Professional malpractice
actions, for example, question the defendant's integrity and competence and may affect
his professional standing. . . Further, one can easily conceive of cases in which the de-
fendant might have a substantial economic stake in Seider litigation-if, for example,
multiple plaintiffs sued in different States for an aggregate amount in excess of the policy
limits, or if a successful claim would affect the policyholder's insurability. For these
reasons, the defendant's interest in the adjudication of his liability cannot reasnably be
characterized as de ,innimus.
Id. at 331 n.20.
75. Id. at 331-32.
1979-1980
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met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction." 76
Recognizing that each of the justifications offered in support of Seider subtly
shifts the focus of jurisdictional inquiry from the defendant to the plaintiff,77
the Rush Court found that such an approach was prohibited by International
Shoe and its progeny which enunciated a defendant-oriented standard. 78
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, 79 criticized the majority's liar-
row reading of International Shoe and its progeny and maintained that, in
determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction was fair and reasonable, tile
defendant's interests should be accorded no greater weight than those of tile
forum state and other parties. 80 In the instant case, Justice Brennan noted
what he considered Minnesota's substantial interest in the litigation, observ-
ing that 1) the action was filed by a Minnesota resident; 2) the state was
concerned both with providing its residents with a forum and with regulating
activities of insurers doing business there; and 3) Minnesota had attempted
to protect such interests through enactment of a special jurisdictional stat-
ute. 8 1  Further, in examining the interest of the parties, Justice Brennan
found that the burden of litigation was actually on the insurer rather than on
76. Id. at 332 (emphasis added). The Rush Court rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's
interpretation of the tripartite "minimum contacts" analysis which "view[ed] as relevant the
relationship between the defending parties, the litigation, and the forum state." Id. at 331 n.21
quoting Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. at 505, 272 N.W.2d at 893 (emphasis supplied by the
Court). For a discussion of the Minnesota Supreme Court's examination of the Seider rule in
light of Shaffer, see note 12 supra.
77. 444 U.S. at 332. This shift was most apparent to the Court in those decisions which
restricted Seider-type jurisdiction to actions by residents of the forum on the ground that utili-
zation by nonresidents would violate due process. Id., citing Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,
411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973); Sav-
chuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976); Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366
N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977). See note 38 supra. This change in emphasis produced the
unacceptable result that "the plaintiff's contacts with the forum [were] decisive in determining
whether the defendant's due process rights [had been] violated." 444 U.S. at 332.
78. 444 U.S. at 332. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
79. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 286, 299 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan prepared a single dissent for both World-Wide Volkswagen and
Rush, decided the same day and involving similar jurisdictional issues. Id. at 299, 302-07.
For further discussion of World-Wide Volkswagen, see notes 92-94 infra.
80. 444 U.S. at 308-09. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found that the nationaliza-
tion of commerce and the ease of transportation and communication that characterize modern
society permit the conclusion that "constitutional concepts of fairness no longer require the
extreme concern for defendants that was once necessary." Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). Instead, consistent with his dissent in Shaffer, Justice Brennan advocated a
broader "minimum contacts" theory, focusing on the existence of sufficient contacts "among the
parties, the contested transaction, and the forum State." Id. at 309-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis in original), quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 225 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further contended that the contacts between any two of the
prongs of the examination should not be considered determinative. 444 U.S. at 310 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan maintained the accentuation of the
interests of the forum state in relation to the litigation did not run afoul the tripartite examina-
tion required under International Shoe. Id. at 302 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather, consid-
ering the forum's interest in this manner merely represented "a shift within the same accepted
relationship from the connections between the defendant and the forum to those between the
forum and the litigation." Id.
[VOL. 25: p. 811
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the .named defendant.8 2  Even accepting the validity of the majority's
defendant-oriented perspective, however, Justice Brennan found sufficient
contacts between the state and the defendant to uphold the exercise of juris-
diction since, by purchasing the policy, the defendant "availed himself of the
benefits he might derive from having an insurance agent in Minnesota who
could, among other things, facilitate a suit for appellant against a Minnesota
resident." 83
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens adopted the view that
the Minnesota procedure was correctly characterized as the "functional equi-
valent" of a direct action statute which, so long as the forum was restrained
from exerting power over the individual defendant, was a constitutionally
permissible exercise of state jurisdiction.
84
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's disposal of the Seider doctrine
in Rush 85 represents a laudable effort to eliminate the last remaining ves-
tiges of the in personan/in rem dichotomy of jurisdictional analysis.8" In
82. Id. at 303 & n.6. (Brennan, j., dissenting). Justice Brennan observed that in Seider-type
litigation, the interests of the insured are purely nominal because 1) the defendant is protected
from personal liability since the action is limited to the value of the policy, and 2) the ease of
airline transportation reduces the amount of time consumed bv travel to distant fora. Id. at
303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Concluding that the real impact of adjudication falls upon the
insurer, Justice Brennan noted that the onl; distinction between the Seider rule and consti-
tutionally permissible direct action statutes "is the formal, 'analytica[l] prerequisite,' . . . of
making the insured a named party" when a direct action statute is involved. Id. at 304 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting), quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 331 (majority opinion). Attacking this
distinction, Justice Brennan argued that "the mere addition of appellant's name to the complaint
does not suffice to create a due process violation," 444 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
In a footnote, Justice Brennan further concluded that the insurance contract itself was the
underlying subject of the litigation since "[t]he very purpose of the contract is to relieve the
insured from having to defend himself, and under the state statute there could be no suit absent
the insurance contract." Id. at 303 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Had Justice Brennan's analysis
been adopted, assertion of jurisdiction in Rush would have been warranted under the rationale
of Shaffer since that Court recognized that when property itself is the "source of the underlying
controversv" jurisdiction may be exercised where the property is situated. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977). For a discussion of Shaffer, see notes 48-52 and accompanying text
supra.
83. 444 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found it "unreasonable to
read the Constitution as permitting one to take advantage of his nationwide insurance network
but not to be burdened by it." Id.
84. 444 U.S. at 333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens maintained that the in-
sured's burden was minimal, particularly since Minnesota had no means by which to compel
him to appear in court or to cooperate in defending the suit. Id. at 334. In adopting the direct
action analogy, however, Justice Stevens emphasized that, in Seider-type cases, only the pro-
ceeds of the policy should be available to satisfy the judgment. Id. As Justice Stevens stated, "it
would violate the Due Process Clause to make any use of such a judgment against [the]
individual-for example, by giving collateral-estoppel effect in a later action against him arising
from the same accident." (citations omitted).
85. See notes 65-78 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Seider doctrine,
see notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 15-24 & 30-38 and accompanying text supra. Although some courts had re-
pudiated the jurisdictional bifurcation shortly after International Shoe and had urged that in
rein power be analyzed according to reasonableness standards, see cases cited note 44 supra,
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Shaffer, the Supreme Court mandated that the tripartite minimum contacts
analysis be applied in every instance in which state court jurisdiction is as-
serted over nonresidents or their property.8 7  As a result, the exercise of
quasi in rem jurisdiction became dependent upon a demonstration of
minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy the fairness requirements of Interna-
tional Shoe.8 8
In this light, then, it is suggested that by examining whether Minnesota
could have established personal jurisdiction over Rush, the Court appro-
priately confronted contentions that Seider was violative of due process.8 9
The Court's emphasis on the defendant's relationship with Minnesota 90 evi-
denced a proper application of the three-pronged standard derived from In-
ternational Shoe and its progeny.91
From Pennoyer to Rush, the Supreme Court has developed, within the
context of the due process clause, a set of jurisdictional principles which
seek to restrain the scope of state judicial power in the interest of our
87. 433 U.S. at 212. See note 49 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that charac-
terizing the Seider procedure as sui generis would not enable it to survive minimum' contacts
scrutiny. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200 (2(1 Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978). In O'Connor, Judge Friendly analyzed Seider as sui generis not to remove
Seider from minimum contacts examination altogether, but simply in order to differentiate that
case from traditional attachment actions such as Harris-type cases which the Shaffer Court had
found to be lacking in minimum contacts. See 579 F.2d at 198-200.
88. See notes 25-29 & 48-52 and accompanying text supra. This interpretation of Shaffer has
been developed by one commentator as follows:
[I]t seems desirable to abolish, for purposes of federal due process considerations, all
distinctions between quasi in rein jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction. (It might be
added that no special consideration should be given to the relatively rare category of
jurisdiction now labeled in rein.) The effect of this would be a holding that the test of
Internatinal Shoe and its progeny is applicable to all exercises of jurisdiction, however
they may be labeled. This is the holding in Shaffer.
Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66 KENTUCKY L.
REV. 1, 24 (1977). Interestingly, this commentation still perceived the utility of quasi in rein
jurisdiction, though only as a procedural option open to a state in cases in which it could have
constitutionally exercised in personam jurisdiction.
To say that the distinction between quasi in rein jurisdiction and in personam juris-
diction is abolished for purposes of substantive due process is not, however, to say that
quasi in rein jurisdiction itself is abolished. Remembering that the in personaui jurisdic-
tional dimensions of International Shoe are merely permissive for the states and not self-
implementing, a state may still choose not to have long arm statutes which go to the outer
limits of due process in establishing in personan jurisdiction. This will mean that there
may be fact patterns in which the state could constitutionally exercise in personal? juris-
diction but has chosen not to do so. In such fact patterns, the state should he left with the
option of providing for the exercise of quasi in rein jurisdiction. Under these cir-
cumstances, the state would merely be using the procedure as it was used historically-as
an adjunct to in personai jurisdiction when the claims being adjudicated do not arise
from the thing itself. The important concept to be remembered about such an exercise is
that it would not in anv way transgress the basic ideas of fairness articulated in Interna-
tional Shoe, since the state would merely be utilizing a more limited form of jurisdiction
in a fact pattern in which it could have used the broader form of in personaii jurisdic-
tion.
Id. at 25. For a discussion of International Shoe, see notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 65-78 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
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federalist system. 92 Since Pennoyer, however, it is suggested that the Court
has refused to completely remove all limitations on state jurisdictional au-
thority, 93 a fact partially illustrated by its continuing emphasis on fairness to
the out-of-state defendant in minimum contacts analysis. 94  It is submitted
that, because of the Court's concern with preserving the delicate balance
between state autonomy and national interest in the area of judicial author-
ity, the Rush Court could not, as Justice Brennan seems to have pro-
pounded, 95 impose jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant merely on the
basis of admittedly substantial interests of the plaintiff and the state where
the defendant's relationship to the forum was virtually nonexistent.
96
92. \Vorld-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980). World-Wide
was a companion case to Rush, decided by the Court on the same day. In World-Wide, Justice
White, writing for the Court, recognized that one function of the minimum contacts approach is
'to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them bv their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 1d. at 292. The gradual expan-
sion of state court power to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants was attrib-
uted to the increasing nationalization of industry and commerce. Id. at 293 (discussing McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957)). See note 29 supra.
93. See Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, Chiet justice Warren, writing
for the majority, remarked:
[Ilt is a mistate to assume that this trend [toward extending the scope of state judicial
power] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts. . . .Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient
or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of
respective States.
Id. at 251 (citation omitted). Furthermore, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980), Justice White pointed out the need to preserve a certain degree of state
judicial autonomy within the federal system:
[M]e have never acceped the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism
embodied in the Constitution. The economic interdependence was foreseen and desired
by the framers. . . .But the Framers also intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in
their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original
scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 293 (citation omitted). See also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
94. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980). Justice
White reaffirmed the International Shoe standard which permits assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion only when "there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State."
Id. at 291, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316. At the same time,
Justice White noted that protection of the defendant is only one of two related functions of the
concept of minimum contacts-the other, previously mentioned, involves the limitations im-
posed upon the state court power. See 444 U.S. at 291-92; notes 25-29, 50, 68, 70 & 77-78 and
accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 81 & 82 supra. In his dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that the purchase of
an insurance policy from an insurer doing business in the forum represents a sufficient "contact"
to permit the exercise of jurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is submitted,
however, that the due process standard as refined in Hanson requires a "purposeful" effort by
the defendant to avail himself of the benefits of the forum state. See notes 29 & 68 and accom-
panying text supra. Merely purchasing an insurance policy from a company licensed to do
business in the state does not, as the majority recognized, seem to fulfill this requirement. See
444 U.S. at 328-29; notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra. Thus, despite such a "contact,"
the Court was warranted in concluding that the defendant had no relation whatever with the
Minnesota forum.
96. See 444 U.S. at 332-33. Several commentators have urged jurisdictional jurisprudence
should elevate the inerests of the state and the plaintiff to a constitutional level equal to that of
1979-1980
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Although the Court appropriately invalidated Seider under quasi in ren
standards, 97 it is submitted that its cursory rejection of the judicially
fashioned direct action rationale98 is subject to criticism. After acknowledg-
ing that assertions of state court jurisdiction were to be inspected under
flexible standards of reasonableness and fairness, 99 the Court distinguished
Seider from direct actions on a strictly theoretical basis which ignored the
realities of the Seider process.100 The dissenters, it is suggested, correctly
perceived that the actual impact of Seider litigation falls on the insurer,
rather than on the defendant, since it is the insurer who has the obligation
under the insurance policy of conducting all aspects of the defense and-of
remitting the value of the judgment in the event of defeat. 101 It is further
suggested that the virtual certainty that subsequent uses of a Seider-type
judgment against the insured in a second state would be constitutionally
the defendant's. See, e.g., Dooling, Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 505 (1979); Sinit, supra note 24; Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 26. Going even
further, one author has proposed a jurisdictional theory under which the interests of the plaintiff
alone may provide the basis fir jurisdiction, even absent any other "contacts" existing between
the defendant and the forum state. See Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants:
Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and The Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DuQ. U. L. REV. 221 (1968). It is
suggested that the common thread uniting approaches is the new emphasis on general consider-
ations of convenience. See Dooling, supra, at 511-18; Smit, supra note 24, at 606-14; Von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 26, at 1167-73. Nevertheless, due process analysis continues
to concentrate on the defendant's interests in an effort to preserve the federal system against
trends seemingly designed to destroy the remaining jurisdictional boundaries that separate the
states. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra. See also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 ([978).
97. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra. A direct action statute provides for the
assertion of in personam authority over an insurer who, by virtue of its conducting business
within the forum state, is deemed to be present for jurisdicional purposes. See notes 46-47 and
accompanying text supra. After Shaffer, however, the sufficiency for due process purposes of
the mere presence of a defendant within the jurisdiction has been questioned. See Werner,
supra note 16, at 602. Jurisdiction may no longer automatically be found where the insurer
conducts its business if that business is unrelated to the subject matter of the litigation. Id.
Since the rule of transient personal jurisdiction has not yet been examined by the Court under
the minimum contacts standards, it is worthwile to examine more thoroughly the possibility that
analogy to direct actions may be employed to support Seider-type jurisdiction.
99. 444 U.S. at 327-28.
100. See id. at 330-31. It should be noted that the Court scrutinized the direct action
rationale under quasi in rei standards, focusing upon the insurer's position as garnishee. Id. In
a pure direct action, however, the insurer is the defendant and the sole question is whether he
possesses sufficient contacts with the forum state. See note 98 supra. It is therefore suggested
that the Court, in refusing to consider the insurer as a real party in interest, has removed the
underlying foundation of the direct action analogy without first giving it proper consideration.
In Rush, Justice Marshall concluded that "[t]he State's ability to exercise power over the
'nominal defendant' is analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the case as garnishee."
444 U.S. at 330-31 (emphasis added). Moreover, Justice Marshall found that where assertion of
jurisdiction over the insured was constitutionally precluded, there could be no "conceptual basis
for bringing the 'garnishee' into the action." Id. at 331 (emphasis added). This position, it is
submitted, appears contrary to the more realistic appraisals made by the Court in Shaffer and
International Shoe. See notes 25-28 & 48-49 and accompanying text supra. As Justice Brennan
noted in Rush, the actual impact of the Seider-type procedure is on the defendant just as in a
direct action. 444 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The only distinction Justice Brennan
uncovered was "the formal, 'analytica[l] prerequisite,' . . . of making the insured a named
party." Id. (footnote omitted).
101. 444 U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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proscribed,1 0 2 combined with Justice Brennan's persuasive contention that
noneconomic interests of the defendant, such as damage to reputation, were
not present in Rush, 10 3 compel the conclusion that the de minimis involve-
ment of the individual defendant in the litigation should not preclude valida-
tion of Seider under the direct action rationale.1
0 4
The decision by the Court in Rush to jettison the Seider-type proce-
dure 105 demonstrates judicial allegiance to the Shaffer goal of attaining a
unitary jurisdictional system. 10 6  In the process, however, it is suggested
that the Rush Court's struggle in applying the subjective jurisdictional stan-
dards enunciated in International Shoe and its progeny 107 indicate that
further development and refinement is required.
Richard Goldstein
102. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916
(1968) (per curiam). See also O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 201-02 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). According to the O'Connor Court, the possibility that
a state could constitutionally give collateral estoppel effect to a Seider-type judgment "has de-
clined to the vanishing point." 579 F.2d at 201-02.
103. 444 U.S. at 304 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan observed that "the possi-
ble impact of a default judgment on the reputation of an individual who has no contacts what-
ever with the forum State is far too remote to effect the analysis of the constitutional issue in
this case." Id.
104. See Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 409, 426-29 (1978). One commentator has pointed out two additional parallels between
direct action and Seider-type procedures which indicate that the impact of a Seider-type judg-
ment on an absentee insured is minimal. Id. First, in both Seider and direct action cases, the
only direct effect upon the insured is to determine whether or not his insurer's obligation to
defend and indemnify him pursuant to the policy has been triggered. Id. at 427. Second, in the
context of a direct action statute, as in a Seider-type proceeding, "an adjudication of exactly the
same legal interest . . . may constitutionallv be maintained directly against an insurer without
any assertion of judisdiction over the insured." Id. at 428 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 65-78 and accompanying text supra. The Rush Court did not address the issue
of whether its decision would apply where no other forum is available to the plaintiff. Cf.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (Court did not consider whether the presence of defend-
ant's property in only fonm available to plaintiff would provide basis for exercise of jurisdic-
tion). Moreover, the Rush Court left unanswered the question of whether jurisdiction could be
properly exercised in Seider-type cases where the property is the subject of the controversy. It
should be recalled that the Court in Shaffer indicated that minimum contacts would often be
satisfied in such a situation. 433 U.S. at 207-08 (footnote omitted); note 51 and accompanying
text supra.
106. See Zammit, supra note 24, at 682. See also notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 25-29 & 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
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